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Decarbonization: Doing More With Less 
Nebo jSa Nakibenovib* 
Doing more with less is a great achievement of advanced societies. Labor, capital, energy, 
other factor inputs and material requirements have decreased per unit output and value 
added since the beginning of the industrial revolution. These productivity increases are 
due to numerous technological and organizational innovations and an enormous accumu- 
lation of knowledge. These achievements are often referred to in the literature as the 
autonomous rates of technological change. 
During this period the production of material and other goods and services outpaced 
population growth in the world, resulting in increasing wealth and improved standards of 
living. The growth in output and economic development in general resulted in positive 
returns from increasing scales of human activities, sometimes referred to as "learning by 
doingn. For example, learning curve analyses provide ample empirical evidence for de- 
creasing costs per unit output proportional to every doubling of the accumulative output. 
There is also rich empirical evidence that materials consumption and labor requirements 
per unit output have decreased during the process of industrialization. In this paper we 
will demonstrate that large decreases in energy requirements per unit economic output 
where achieved throughout the world and furthermore that carbon dioxide emissions have 
also decreased per unit energy. At the same time, absolute world consumption levels of 
energy and other resources have increased, particularly vigorously in the more industrial- 
ized countries. This should not be confused, however, with the fact that energy and most 
of the other factor inputs have decreased per unit output. 
First, we will show the tendency towards decreases in specific labor and material require- 
ments before demonstrating that the reduction of energy and carbon emissions per unit 
activity is a secular process taking place throughout the world. Figure 1 shows the annual 
working hours in a number of industrialized countries: which have halved over the last 130 
years. Japan is something of an exception where the decrease was not so rapid perhaps 
also partly explaining the present higher productivity of this country. If we take into 
account that individual income and consumption have increased dramatically over the 
same time period, then it becomes evident that the labor requirements per unit income 
and output and decreased even faster than the number of hours worked. Furthermore, life 
expectancy has also increased during this period so that the effective labor requirements 
for life long consumption have decreased from more than three-quarters of the lifetime to 
less than one-quarter. 
Figure 2 shows similarly dramatic decreases in some material requirements per unit output 
in the United States that are representative for a number of industrialized countries. 
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However, it is not clear that dematerialization is a universal process. As the requirements 
for some materials, such as steel, decreases, newer and more advanced materials replace 
them. For example, there is a growing need for petrochemicals and advanced material 
such as carbon fiber, silicon and so on. Ironically, the so-called information revolution 
has resulted in the growth of the specific paper requirements. Such counter examples 
demonstrate that dematerialization is occurring in some sectors but not others and is 
thus not a pervasive phenomenon. 
In contrast, decreases in energy intensity of economic activities and decarbonization are 
pervasive and an almost universal developments. The analysis of these two pervasive 
tendencies can perhaps shed more light indirectly on the question of whether the dema- 
terialization is occurring as well. Energy is one of the most important factor inputs and 
is embedded in most of materials, products and services, so that decreases in specific en- 
ergy requirements can also contribute toward decreasing material intensity. The carbon 
content of energy and, therefore, the subsequent carbon dioxide emissions, represent one 
of the largest single mass flows that can be associated with human activities. Current 
annual emissions are about 6 Gigatons (billion tons) of carbon or more than 20 Giga- 
tons of carbon dioxide. In comparison, global steel production is on the order of 700 
Megatons (million tons). Therefore, decarbonization contributes in a large way towards 
dematerialization. 
Decarbonization can be expressed as a product of two factors: (1) specific carbon emissions 
per unit energy; and (2) energy requirements per unit value added, often called energy 
intensity. Both of these factors are decreasing in the world but are being outpaced by the 
rate of economic growth, resulting in an overall global increase in energy consumption 
and carbon dioxide emissions. 
In general, the instrumental determinants of future energy-related Carbon dioxide emis- 
sions could be represented as multiplicative factors in the hypothetical equation that 
determines global emission levels. The K a y a  ident i ty  establishes a relationship between 
population growth, per capital value added, energy per value added and carbon emissions 
per energy on one side of the equation, and total carbon dioxide emissions on the other 
(Yamaji et al., 1991)'. Two of these factors are increasing and two are declining at the 
global level. 
At present, the world's global population is increasing at a rate of about 2% per year. The 
longer-term historical growth rates since 1800 have been about 1% per year. Most of the 
population projections expect at least another doubling during the next century (see UN, 
1992a, and Vu, 1985). Productivity has been increasing in excess of global population 
growth since the beginning of industrialization and thus has resulted in more economic 
activity and value added per capita. Energy intensity per unit value added has been 
decreasing at a rate of about 1% per year since the 1860s and at about 2% per year in 
most countries since the 1970s. Carbon dioxide emissions per unit of energy have also 
been decreasing but at a much lower rate of about 0.3% per year. 
Figure 3 illustrates the extent of this "decarbonizationn in terms of the ratio of average 
carbon dioxide emissions per unit of primary energy consumed globally since 1860. The 
ratio decreases due to the continuous replacement of fuels with high carbon contents, 
'COz = (COz/E) x (EIGDP) x (GDPIP) x P, where E represents energy consumption, GDP the 
gross domestic product or value added, and P population. Changes in carbon dioxide emissions can be 
described by changes in these four factors. 
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such as coal, by those with low carbon contents and most recently also nuclear energy. 
Figure 4 shows the historical decrease in energy intensity per unit value added in a num- 
ber of countries. Energy development paths in different countries have varied enormously 
and consistently over long periods, but the overall tendency is towards lower energy in- 
tensities. For example, France and Japan have always used energy more efficiently than 
the United States, the United Kingdom or Germany. This should be contrasted with the 
opposite development in some of the rapidly industrializing countries, where commercial 
energy intensity is still increasing, such as in Nigeria. Commercial energy is replacing 
traditional energy forms so that total energy intensity is diminishing while commercial 
energy intensity is increasing. The present energy intensity of Thailand resembles the 
situation in the United States in the late 1940s. The energy intensity of India and its 
present improvement rates are similar to those of the United States about a century ago. 
Figure 5 shows the degrees of decarbonization and energy deintensification achieved in 
a number of countries since the 1870s. It illustrates salient differences in the policies 
and structures of energy systems among countries. For example, Japan and France 
have achieved the largest degrees of decarbonization; in Japan this has been achieved 
largely through energy efficiency improvements over recent decades, while in France 
largely through vigorous substitution of fossil fuels by nuclear energy. Most countries 
have achieved decarbonization through the replacement of coal first by oil, and later by 
natural gas. 
At the global level, the long-term reduction in carbon intensity per unit value added 
has been about 1.3% per year since the mid-1800s. Decarbonization of energy occurs at 
about 0.3% per year and the reduction of energy intensity of value added at about 1% 
per year, resulting in overall carbon intensity of value added reduction of about 1.3% per 
year. This falls short by about 1.7% of what is required to offset the effects of global 
economic growth, with rates of about 3% per year. This means that the global carbon 
dioxide emissions have been increasing at about 1.7% per year, implying a doubling before 
the 2030s. This is in fact quite close to emission levels projected in some of the global 
scenarios. 
We have selected five representative countries in order to analyze the decarbonization 
processes in greater detail: China, France, Japan, India and the United States. Based 
on the joint research of the author, Arnulf Griibler and Gilbert Ahamer (NakiCenoviC et 
al. 1993), decarbonization for various parts of the energy systems in these countries will 
be shown. These countries are representative because they demonstrate the diversity of 
different development paths and lifestyles. Some other reasons for choosing these five 
countries have already been indirectly given above. For example, the United States has 
one of the highest energy intensities of the industrialized countries and also the highest 
per capita energy consumption in the world. France and Japan, on the other hand, have 
among the lowest energy intensities in the world but for different reasons. Finally, China 
and India represent two rapidly developing countries where the replacement of traditional 
by fossil energy is still not completed resulting in very high energy and carbon intensities. 
Together, these countries account for 43.5% of global primary energy consumption and 
41.4% for C 0 2  energy related carbon dioxide emissions. 
In this paper we will focus on the analysis of decarbonization only in order to  determine 
more precisely the various causes and determinants for the decreasing carbon intensity 
of energy. To do this, we need to disaggregate the energy system into its three major 
constituents: primary energy requirements, energy conversion, and final energy consump- 
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tion. As the structure of the energy system changes, so does the carbon intensity of these 
three constituent parts. Final energy is directly consumed and therefore represents the 
actual energy requirements of the economy and individual consumers. The rest of the 
energy system (primary energy and its conversion) are not really transparent to the con- 
sumers. Therefore, determining decarbonization as a ratio of total carbon emissions per 
unit primary energy removes the analysis from the actual point of consumption and the 
interaction between the energy system and the economy. The actual final energy forms de- 
manded and consumed represent a clearer demonstration of carbon intensity at the point 
of consumption. For example, it is pretty much irrelevant to  the consumer how electricity 
is produced. Since it is carbon free it does not lead to  any carbon emissions a t  the point of 
consumption. Carbon is emitted in converting primary energy forms into final electricity. 
To a lesser degree this is also the case with other forms of final energy, such as oil prod- 
ucts. The specific carbon emissions per liter of diesel or gasoline are basically the same 
throughout the world, however, the carbon emissions that result in converting different 
grades of crude oil into these two products vary substantially. Coal, on the other hand, 
is rarely consumed in its primary form and is mostly converted into electricity. In order 
to decouple the decarbonization rates that occur in the energy system from those that 
occur a t  the point of final energy consumption, we have made the following assumptions: 
(1) Carbon intensity of primary energy is defined as the ratio of total carbon content of 
primary energy divided by total primary energy requirements (consumption) for a given 
country. As such, this definition is identical to the one used to define the carbon intensity 
of primary energy in the world given in Figure 3. (2) Carbon intensity of final energy is 
defined as the carbon content of all final energy forms consumed divided by total final 
energy consumption. Various final energy forms that are delivered to the point of final 
consumption include solid fuels, such as biomass, coal, oil products, gas, chemical feed 
stocks, electricity and heat. Electricity and heat do not contain any carbon. Thus it is 
evident on an a priori basis that the carbon intensity of final energy should generally be 
lower than the carbon intensity of primary energy. In addition, its rate of decrease should 
be slightly higher than that of primary energy decarbonization because of the increasing 
share of electricity and other fuels with lower carbon content, such as natural gas, in the 
final energy mix. (3) Carbon intensity of energy conversion is defined as the difference 
between the two intensities above. 
Generally, these categories represent the carbon emissions resulting from the energy sys- 
tem itself while the carbon intensity of final energy represents the carbon emissions due 
to the actual energy required by the economy and individual consumers. Therefore, the 
former is a function of the specific energy situation in a given country while the latter 
is a function of economic structure and consumer behavior. The  difference between the 
two provides deeper insight into the carbon emissions that result from energy and econ- 
omy interactions, and those that are determined by the nature of primary energy supply, 
conversion and distribution. 
Figures 6 to 10 give the three carbon intensities for the five countries, respectively, for 
the period 1960 to 1991. The relationship among the three ratios for the United States 
and Japan in Figures 6 and 7 portrays the behavior one would anticipate on an a priori 
basis: final carbon intensity is lower than the primary one, while conversion intensity is 
the highest. Reduction of final carbon intensity is slightly higher in Japan with about 
0.8% per year compared to about 0.5% in the United States. The difference in the 
conversion carbon intensities are much more dramatic. In both cases these ratios change 
more erratically compared to the relatively smooth improvements in primary and final 
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intensities. Especially in Japan, the improvement rates since 1965 have been vigorous, 
outpacing the reduction rates of final intensity. As can be seen from Figure 5, the reduction 
of carbon intensity in Japan is due to high energy efficiency improvements and, to  a lesser 
degree, to the replacement of carbon intensive energy forms. Efficiency improvements 
in the energy system imply that less primary energy is consumed per unit final and, 
therefore, lower conversion losses result in lower carbon emissions. 
Figure 8 illustrates the opposite case for France. Here, the rapid introduction of nuclear 
energy since the mid-1970s has led to higher rates of decarbonization of primary energy 
and conversion than that of final energy. This illustrates a fundamentally different strat- 
egy to achieve low carbon emissions. Basically it is decoupled from the consumer and is 
completely internal to  the energy system. The French nuclear development path really 
meant that the increasing share of electricity is produced without carbon emissions, there- 
fore lowering the overall carbon intensity of conversion. On the other hand, the relatively 
smooth improvement in final carbon intensity is very similar to that observed in Japan 
and the United States. 
Figures 9 and 10 show quite different situations in China and India. First, it is important 
to note that the changes in the three ratios are very similar in these two rapidly developing 
economies, although one has a planned economy and the other a market one. They also 
have very many social and cultural differences. In both countries, carbon intensity in pri- 
mary energy is basically stationary and shows only marginal signs of improvement. The 
carbon intensity of final energy, on the other hand, is improving a t  rates comparable to 
those observed in industrialized countries. In China the reduction of final energy carbon 
intensity is close to 0.5% per year, and in India a t  the impressive rate of 1.1% per year. In 
the latter case, the rapid decarbonization of final energy is due to  the replacement of tra- 
ditional fuels by commercial energy forms. For example, the unsustainable use of biomass 
is more carbon intensive than kerosene and bottled gas. The difference in carbon inten- 
sity of lighting between electricity (especially if efficient light bulbs are used) compared to  
traditional practices is even more pronounced. In any case, the developing economies are 
undergoing basically the same process of decarbonizing final energy use as do the most 
developed. This indicates congruence in consumer behavior as expressed in the struc- 
ture of final energy used at different income and development levels. Decarbonization is, 
therefore, a pervasive phenomenon. 
In the industrialized countries, decarbonization of final energy consumption has been 
accompanied by appropriate structural changes in the energy system. This led to  im- 
provements in decarbonization in the energy system itself as demonstrated in the carbon 
intensity of conversion. Subsequently, the decarbonization of primary energy intensity 
could also be improved. In contrast, China and India have not undergone this transition. 
Their energy systems depend heavily on coal which is a very carbon intensive source of 
energy. In industrialized countries, coal has been largely replaced by less carbon inten- 
sive sources, especially in electricity production. As a consequence of this difference, the 
carbon intensity of conversion is increasing rapidly in both China and India. Should a 
transition to lower carbon intensity not occur in the forthcoming decades, it is quite likely 
that the relative reductions in specific carbon emissions in the industrialized countries will 
be offset by this trend. This will naturally hamper efforts to halt the increase in global 
carbon emissions. 
Figures 11, 12 and 13 compare the three ratios for the five countries. The congruence in 
the gradual reduction of final energy carbon intensity is illustrated in Figure 11. The de- 
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velopment is convergent in the three industrialized countries and is accompanied by more 
rapid changes in the developing countries, especially in India which has much higher ab- 
solute intensity levels. This means that the gap between the developed and developing 
countries is gradually narrowing. Final energy consumption is proceeding along a similar 
development path in all five countries. The share of electricity in final energy is increasing 
throughout the world. The average mix of other fuels consumed has a decreasing carbon 
content, that is, increasing shares of natural gas and of oil products with a higher hydro- 
gen content. In other words, the hydrogen to carbon ratio of average fuel consumed is 
increasing globally. These two factors, namely, the increasing hydrogen content of fuels 
and the increasing share of electricity result in the steady improvement in the final energy 
carbon intensity given in Figure 11. 
The carbon intensities of conversion give a completely different picture in Figure 12. The 
diversity in the development and structural changes of the energy systems in these five 
countries is apparent. In the developing countries, carbon intensity is increasing while 
in the industrialized countries it is decreasing a t  various rates, most rapidly in France 
due to the vigorous introduction of nuclear energy. This heterogeneity indicates not only 
the richness in different types of energy systems in the world but also different future 
development strategies. Should China and India continue to rely heavily on coal as the 
primary energy source of preference, then it might not be possible to continue to  improve 
the carbon intensity of final energy in these countries. This means that sometime in the 
next century a trend reversal could be expected, either in the carbon intensity of final 
energy or primary energy or both. The only bridge between these opposing trends could 
be even higher shares of electricity. The other alternative for the future is that the energy 
system restructures towards natural gas, nuclear energy, biomass and other zero carbon 
options. This would bring the energy systems of these two developing countries in line 
with those of the more industrialized ones. At the same time, such structural changes 
would allow for continued improvements in the carbon intensity of final energy consistent 
with the reduction of specific requirements of other factor inputs and materials throughout 
the world economy. 
Figure 13 shows that, for the time being, the carbon intensity of primary energy is still 
developing in the same direction in all of these countries. However, as mentioned above, 
without the proposed structural changes in the energy systems toward carbon free and 
hydrogen rich sources of primary energy, trend reversals cannot be excluded in the future. 
This figure also illustrates the large impacts in achieving decarbonization by introducing 
zero carbon sources of energy as illustrated by the growing shares of nuclear power in 
France. 
There is a possible way to reconcile the increasing needs for electricity and hydrogen 
rich forms of final energy with the relatively slow and often opposing changes in the 
structure of energy systems and primary energy supply. This can be best illustrated 
by the historical replacement of coal by oil and later by natural gas a t  the global level. 
Primary energy substitution (Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 1979; Ausubel, e t  al. 1988; 
Griibler and NakidenoviC, 1988; NakidenoviC, 1990) suggests the likelihood that natural 
gas and later carbon free energy forms will become major sources of energy globally during 
the next century. 
Figure 14 shows the competitive struggle between the five main sources of primary energy 
as a dynamic and quite regular process that can be described by relatively simple rules. 
The substitution process clearly indicates the dominance of coal as the major energy 
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source between the 1880s and the 1960s after a long period during which fuelwood (and 
other traditional energy sources) where in the lead. The massive expansion of railroads, 
the growth of steel, steamships and many other sectors, are associated with and based 
on technological opportunities offered by the mature coal economy. After the 1960s, oil 
assumed a dominant role simultaneously with the maturing of the automotive, petro- 
chemical and other industries. The current reliance on coal in many developing countries 
illustrates the gap between the structure of primary energy supply and actual final energy 
needs. 
Figure 14 projects natural gas as the dominant source of energy during the first decades 
of the next century although oil still maintains the second largest share until the 2040s. 
For such an explorative "look into the futuren, additional assumptions are required to 
describe the future competition of potential new energy sources, such as, nuclear, solar 
and other renewables that have not yet captured sufficient market shares to allow an 
estimation of their penetration rates. In the future, we assume that nuclear energy will 
diffuse at comparable rates as oil and natural gas half a century earlier. Such a scenario 
would require a new generation of nuclear installations; today such prospects are at best 
questionable. This leaves natural gas with the lion's share of primary energy during the 
next 50 years. In the past, new sources of energy have emerged from time to time coincid- 
ing with the saturation and subsequent decline of the dominant competitor. "Solfus" is a 
term employed to describe a major new energy technology, for example, solar or fusion, 
that could emerge during the 2040s at the time when natural gas is expected to saturate. 
This analysis of primary energy substitution and market penetration suggests that natural 
gas will become the dominant energy source and remain so for half a century, perhaps to 
be replaced by carbon free energy sources, such as nuclear, solar or fusion. Thus, primary 
energy substitution implies a gradual continuation of energy decarbonization in the world. 
The methane economy could provide a bridge towards a carbon free future. 
Figure 15 shows the resulting changes in the hydrogen to carbon ratio from global primary 
energy substitution. Fuelwood has the highest carbon content with about one hydrogen 
per 10 carbon atoms. If consumed unsustainably, as was the case in the past and still 
is in most developing countries, fuelwood has higher carbon emissions than all the fossil 
energy forms. From the fossil energy sources coal has the lowest hydrogen to carbon 
atomic ratio of roughly one to one. Oil has on average two hydrogen per one carbon 
atom, and natural gas or methane, four. These factors are used in Figure 15 to determine 
the hydrogen to carbon ratio of global energy. This ratio can be expected to increase as 
projected in the Figure 15 to the asymptotic level of four hydrogen to one carbon atom 
if natural gas becomes the dominant form of energy. Further improvements would have 
to be achieved by the introduction of non-fossil energy sources, such as, nuclear, solar, 
fusion and sustainable use of biomass. The methane economy offers the bridge to this 
non-fossil energy future consistent both with the dynamics of primary energy substitution 
and steadily increasing carbon intensity of final energy. As non-fossil energy sources are 
introduced in the primary energy mix, new energy conversion systems would be required 
to provide other zero carbon energy carriers in addition to growing shares of electricity. As 
suggested in Figure 15 an ideal candidate is hydrogen. Thus, the methane economy would 
lead to a greater role for energy gases and later hydrogen in conjunction with electricity. 
Hydrogen and electricity could provide virtually pollution free and environmentally benign 
energy carriers. 
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Figure 16 shows the increase in the share of electricity in the world that is complementary 
to the increase of the hydrogen to carbon ratio of primary energy. To the extent that 
both hydrogen and electricity might be produced from methane, the separated carbon 
could be contained and subsequently stored within the energy sector. As the methane 
contribution to global energy saturates and subsequently declines, carbon free sources of 
energy would take over and eliminate the need for carbon handling and storage. This 
would also conclude the decarbonization process in the world. 
The energy system of the distant future that would rely on electricity and hydrogen as 
two complementary energy carriers and final energy forms, would represent a gigantic step 
towards dematerialization. Electron has extremely low mass and hydrogen has the lowest 
mass of all atoms, consisting only of a proton and an electron. This transition would rad- 
ically reduce the total mass flow associated with energy activities and, more importantly, 
the resulting emissions. Electricity is emission free and appropriate hydrogen combustion 
results in water. Decarbonization would not only contribute towards dematerialization, 
but is also consistent with the emergence of new technologies that hold the promise of 
higher flexibility, productivity and environmental compatibility. Micro-electronics, bio- 
and nanotechnologies, virtual reality, and information and communication systems are all 
more compatible with a hydrogen-electricity economy than with any other. 
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HOURS WORKED PER YEAR 
Data: Maddison, 1991 
Figure 1: Annual working hours in five industrialized countries from 1960 t o  1990, ex- 
pressed in total working hours per year (hours spent on sick leave, strikes and holidays 
are subtracted from the  formal working time). Data: Maddison, 1991. 
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Figure 2: Material consumption per value added, expressed in kilograms apparent con- 
sumption over GNP. Source: Williams et  al., 1987. 
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Figure 3: Global decarbonization of energy from 1900 to 1990, expressed in tons of carbon 
per kilowatt year (tC/kWyr). 
IIA SA 
Decarbonization: Doing More With Less 
I 
2 .44  
I 
China I 
Figure 4: Primary energy intensity, including biomass, of value added from 1855 to 1990, 
expressed in watt years per constant GDP in 1980 U.S. dollars. (Primary electricity is 
accounted for by equivalence method.) 
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Figure 5: Global decarbonization and deintensification of energy from 1870 to 1988 ex- 
pressed in kilograms of carbon per kilograms of oil equivalent energy (kgC/kgoe), and 
in kilograms oil equivalent energy per $1,000 per GDP in constant 1985 dollars. Source: 
Griibler, 1991. 
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Figure 6: Carbon intensities of primary, final and conversion energy from 1960 to 1991 for 
the United States, expressed in tons of carbon per ton of oil equivalent energy (tC/toe). 
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Figure 7: Carbon intensities of primary, final and conversion energy from 1960 to 1991 
for Japan, expressed in tons of carbon per ton of oil equivalent energy (tc/toe). 
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Figure 8: Carbon intensities of primary, final and conversion energy from 1960 to 1991 
for France, expressed in tons of carbon per ton of oil equivalent energy (tc/toe). 
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Figure 9: Carbon intensities of primary, final and conversion energy from 1971 to 1991 
for China, expressed in tons of carbon per ton of oil equivalent energy (tcltoe). 
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Figure 10: Carbon intensities of primary, final and conversion energy from 1971 to 1991 
for India, expressed in tons of carbon per ton of oil equivalent energy (tc/toe). 
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Figure 11: Carbon intensity of final energy for China, France, India, Japan and the United 
States from 1960 to 1991, expressed in tons of carbon per ton of oil equivalent final energy 
(tcltoe). 
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Figure 12: Carbon intensity of energy conversion for China, France, India, Japan and the 
United States from 1960 to 1991, expressed in tons of carbon per ton of oil equivalent 
converted energy (tcltoe). 
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Figure 13: Carbon intensity of primary energy for China, France, India, Japan and the 
United States from 1960 to 1991, expressed in tons of carbon per ton of oil equivalent 
primary energy (tcltoe).  
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Figure 14: Global primary energy substitution from 1960 to 1982 and projections for the 
future, expressed in fractional market shares (F). Smooth lines represent model calcula- 
tions and jagged lines are historical data. "Solfus" is a term employed to  describe a major 
new energy technology, for example, solar or fusion. Source: Griibler and NakiCenoviC, 
1988; NakiCenoviC, 1990. 
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Figure 15: Hydrogen-to-carbon ratio of global primary energy from 1860 to  1982 and 
projections for the future, expressed in fractional shares of hydrogen and carbon in average 
primary energy consumed (H/C). Source: Marchetti, 1982. 
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Figure 16: Share of world primary energy going to electricity. Source: H.D. Schilling and 
R. Hildebrandt, 1977 and UN Energy Statistics Yearbook, 1992. 
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